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TRENDS IN BREAKFAST MEAL AND MAIZE MARKETING  
MARGINS IN ZAMBIA 
 






 Maize market reform in Zambia appears to have brought tangible benefits to consumers 
by reducing maize meal prices without reducing grain prices for farmers. 
 The wholesale-to-retail maize marketing margins have been trending downwards most 
regions of Zambia. 
 Based on estimates of 3.5 million urban “adult equivalent” consumers purchasing 120 kg 
of breakfast meal per year, the declining maize meal milling and retailing margins have 
saved Zambian consumers roughly US$29.4 million (123 billion kwacha) each year.  
 Low-income consumers access to food would be greatly improved if grain could be sold 
onto informal local markets at times when imports are required (instead of channeling all 
imports to large millers only).   
 The ability of the small-scale milling sector to keep competitive pressure on the large 




INTRODUCTION:  There has been much 
debate in Zambia and in Africa more 
generally about the effects of food market 
reform on the welfare of low-income 
consumers. It has often been contended that 
market reform has given traders and millers 
the ability to increase their marketing margins 
after control prices were eliminated, thereby 
exposing farmers and consumers to increased 
exploitation for a strategically important 
commodity. These debates can be better 
informed by reviewing the empirical record 
on changes in food prices and marketing 
margins in countries having undertaken food 
market liberalization programs.  
 
OBJECTIVES:  This policy synthesis 
analyzes the trends in retail maize meal prices 
and the wholesale-retail margins enjoyed by 
millers and retailers in Zambia since maize 
and maize meal prices were decontrolled in 
the early 1990s.  This note summarizes 
material from a broader study on Zambia’s 
maize supply chain.
1 The findings from this 
paper are designed to inform policy 
discussions aimed at improving household 
food security and maize market performance 
in Zambia.  
 
DATA AND METHODS: The study uses 
monthly wholesale maize grain and retail 
breakfast meal price information for the 
period May 1994 to April 2005, collected by 
the Agricultural Marketing Information 
Centre (AMIC).  Econometric analyses is 
used to analyze the determinants of maize 
marketing margins and the trends in these 
margins over time after controlling for 
  Page 1exogenous demand and supply factors such as 
rainfall, changes in technology, government 
policy, seasonality in prices and margins and 
macroeconomic variables.  All prices were 
adjusted by the 2005 consumer price index.  
Data were available for six markets (Lusaka, 
Choma Kasama, Kabwe, Ndola, and 
Chipata). 
 
MAIN FINDINGS: The wholesale-to-retail 
maize marketing margins have been trending 
downwards in 5 of the 6 markets for which 
data was available (the exception being 
Chipata).  On average the wholesale-to-retail 
margin declined by 9.30 Kwacha/tonne per 
month (Table 1, column C).  Ten years into 
the reform process, real breakfast meal prices 
have declined by 35%, while milling/retailing 
marketing margins have been cut in half 
(Figure 1 and Figure 2A-E in appendix).   
Based on estimates of 3.5 million urban 
“adult equivalent” consumers purchasing 120 
kg of breakfast meal per year, the declining 
maize meal milling and retailing margins 
have saved Zambian consumers roughly 
US$29.4 million (123 billion kwacha) each 
year.  
 
There are two explanations for the finding 
that market reform reduced maize 
milling/retail margins in Zambia.  First, the 
reforms brought about a more competitive 
market structure.  Prior to market 
liberalization, a few officially registered 
maize-processing firms had a de facto 
oligopoly on milling maize and supplying the 
retail sector.  Regulations made it difficult for 
non-registered millers and traders to transport 
grain into urban areas or acquire grain from 
the marketing board. Market reform opened 
this system to greater competition as small-
scale millers and retailers who were 
previously excluded from entering the market 
were now allowed to procure and transport 
grain freely across district boundaries.  Rapid 
investment in medium- and small-scale 
milling and retailing networks occurred 
almost immediately after the reforms were 
implemented. In response to greater 
competition, the registered large milling 
companies cut their prices in an attempt to 
regain lost market share.  Greater competition 
in milling and retailing exerted downward 
pressure on the milling/retailing margins of 
the large-scale firms’ products, thereby 
benefiting consumers.  
 
Figure 1.  Trends in Lusaka wholesale maize grain 
prices, breakfast meal prices and marketing 














































































































































The second explanation for declining maize 
meal prices has to do with the expanded range 
of maize meal products available to 
consumers.  The small millers who rapidly 
entered the market after the reforms produced 
a range of refined and unrefined maize meal 
products.  Mugaiwa, or straight-run meal 
produced by small millers, appears to be a 
common and relatively inexpensive staple 
food product among the urban poor. Before 
the reforms, small millers were unable to 
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marketing system prohibited informal grain 
flows into urban areas.  
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS:  Maize market 
reform in Zambia appears to have brought 
tangible benefits to consumers by reducing 
maize meal prices without reducing grain 
prices for farmers.  The lower processing 
costs charged by small-scale hammer millers 
have exerted competitive pressures on the 
large-scale milling and retailing industry to 
cut costs in order to retain market share.  Cost 
reduction may also be due to efficiency 
improvements within the large-scale milling 
and retails sectors as well.   
 
However, the ability of the small-scale 
milling sector to keep competitive pressure on 
the large milling sector will depend on 
ensuring the availability of maize grain in 
local markets.  In certain years during the 
liberalization process (e.g., 2001/02 and 
2005/06), the government has unintentionally 
subverted this objective, by announcing that it 
would import maize to sell at subsidized 
prices (thus discouraging the private sector 
from doing so) but then delaying doing so 
until after supply shortages emerged, which 
forced market prices to exceed import parity 
levels. These are the only periods in the 
liberalization process when breakfast meal 
prices rose above import parity.  In such 
cases, due to the scarcity of maize grain in 
local markets, poor households have no 
choice but to purchase more expensive 
industrial maize meal.  Low-income 
consumers’ access to food would be greatly 
improved if grain could be sold onto informal 
local markets at times when imports are 
required (instead of channeling all imports to 
large millers only).  The evidence over the 
past decade indicates that open regional trade 
for both large and small-scale traders will 
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Table 1:   Summary of linear trend results on 












margin  Market 
Linear trend  [Average monthly Kwacha 
increase or decrease] 
 (A)  (B)  (C) 
National-
Average
1.11 -12.50*  -8.93** 
Lusaka 0.46  -9.76*  -9.41** 
Choma 1.88  -10.86*  -10.16** 
Kabwe -0.36  -10.66**  -7.20** 
Chipata -4.16  -4.48  -0.28 
Ndola 4.26*  -14.84**  -9.60** 
Kasama -0.71  -12.83  -10.03** 
 
Source: AMIC -various years 
 
Notes:  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.   
aSee Jayne et al. 2006 for the 
complete set of results.  
 
Page 3 Figure 2A-E:  Trends in wholesale maize grain prices, breakfast meal prices and marketing margins, 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































E(ii):  Choma: wholesale-retail margin
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